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‘Flash Crash’: The first market crash in the era of algorithms and
automated trading
How non-designated intraday intermediaries responded in the E-mini S&P 500
futures market crash on 6 May 2010 - by Andrei Kirilenko, Albert Kyle, Mehrdad
Samadi, and Tugkan Tuzun
On 6 May 2010, US financial markets experienced a systemic intraday event that has come to be
known as the “Flash Crash.”[i] The large and temporary decline in prices and the corresponding
increase in trading volume in the S&P 500 E-mini Futures on 6 May is depicted in the figure below.
During this extreme volatility event, which took about thirty minutes, volume increased and prices
declined before they recovered to their pre-drop levels.
Figure 1. Minute-by-minute transaction prices and trading volume of the June 2010 E-mini S&P futures contract on 6 May
2010, between 8:30 and 15:15 CT
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Note: Trading volume is calculated as the number of contracts traded during each minute. Transaction price is the last transaction
price of each minute. Source: “Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010.”
In our recent publication, we parse second-by-second trading in the bellwether E-mini S&P 500
futures market before and during the “Flash Crash” of 6 May 2010, shedding light on the previously
unseen ecosystem of algorithmic trading and the first market crash in the era of automated trading. In
our article, we investigate the responses of intraday intermediaries to this large and temporary selling
pressure. The automation of financial markets has transformed the way financial assets trade.
Electronic trading platforms have spurred increased use of automated trading strategies by different
types of participants, including market intermediaries. While market participants without formal market
making designations have increasingly provided the function of intermediation, intermediation
remains an essential function in markets where buyer and sellers do not arrive simultaneously. The
fully automated E-mini S&P 500 futures market—a market with no designated intermediaries—
provides a laboratory for examining the responses of non-designated intraday intermediaries during a
period of large and temporary selling pressure.
Using a novel, data-driven trader classification approach, we catalog trading accounts based on how
they trade. Guided by the literature on the inventory management of intermediaries, we classify
accounts into categories such as high-frequency traders (HFTs) and market makers in order to
examine their responses to the large and temporary selling pressure observed on 6 May.
7/6/2017 LSE Business Review – ‘Flash Crash’: The first market crash in the era of algorithms and automated trading
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/06/26/flash-crash-the-first-market-crash-in-the-era-of-algorithms-and-automated-trading/ 3/4
Theory suggests that market crashes can occur if there are large and temporary selling pressures. If
a small imbalance exists, then intermediaries are supposed to provide liquidity to smooth the
imbalance. However, market makers have limited risk-bearing capacity. If this capacity is
overwhelmed, then liquidity crashes can occur, resulting in wild fluctuations in prices in the absence
of important news about fundamentals.
In our research, we conclude that the behaviour of non-designated intraday intermediaries is
consistent with the theory of limited risk-bearing capacity: they did not take on large risky inventories
relative to the large and temporary selling pressure on 6 May. Furthermore, our results suggest that
the most active intraday intermediaries, HFTs, are not simply the electronic version of traditional
market makers. They exhibit high-frequency market timing. They buy before market prices increase
and sell before market prices decrease; this behaviour is not consistent with traditional market
making.
For a period, the “Flash Crash” seemed like an isolated event. However, the “Flash Rally” in the U.S.
Treasury markets on 15 October 2014 reignited discussion about the vulnerability of liquid automated
markets to severe dislocations and disruptive trading. Our empirical approach provides a framework
for studying intraday market dynamics before and during such systemic events and highlights the
need to design mechanisms in order to stop future crashes before they occur.
[i] This event is described in detail in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission– Securities
Exchange Commission (CFTC-SEC (2010)) joint report: “At 2:32 [CT] p.m., against [a] backdrop of
unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental trader (a mutual fund complex)
initiated a sell program to sell a total of 75,000 E-mini [S&P 500 futures] contracts (valued at
approximately $4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position. [ . . . ] This large fundamental
trader chose to execute this sell program via an automated execution algorithm (“Sell Algorithm”) that
was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-mini market to target an execution rate set to
9% of the trading volume calculated over the previous minute, but without regard to price or time. The
execution of this sell program resulted in the largest net change in daily position of any trader in the
E-mini since the beginning of the year (from January 1, 2010 through May 6, 2010). [ . . . ] Securities,
including many ETFs, were executed at prices 60% or more away from their 2:40 p.m. prices. [ . . . ]
By 3:08 p.m., [ . . . ] the E-mini prices [were] back to nearly their pre-drop level [ . . . and] most
securities had reverted back to trading at prices reflecting true consensus values.”
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